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Translation of three short papers by Grete Hermann 
Guido Bacciagaluppi* 
 
After a number of years of relative neglect, it is now becoming apparent that Grete Hermann (1901-1984) 
was one of the most accomplished neo-Kantian philosophers of the last century – in part thanks to the 
recent publication of two volumes on and of her work, one in English (Crull and Bacciagaluppi 2017) and 
one in German (Herrmann 2019), both reviewed in this issue. The latter in particular contains Hermann’s 
entire output on modern physics and philosophy of science.  
Below I translate the three shortest papers by Hermann in that volume, which I introduce here. They 
provide quick but fascinating glimpses into some of Hermann’s ideas on philosophy of science, quantum 
mechanics, and transcendental idealism. They are: from 1935 a book review of Popper's Logik der 
Forschung [the original German edition of the Logic of scientific discovery], from 1936 a comment on 
Schlick’s posthumously published talk ‘Quantentheorie und Erkennbarkeit der Natur’ [‘Quantum Theory 
and Knowability of Nature’], and from 1937 a short summary of Hermann’s ideas on the relation between 
Kant’s philosophy and modern physics (specifically electrodynamics, the special and general theories of 
relativity, and quantum mechanics) presented at the Congrès Descartes in Paris.1 
 
1 Popper review 
Popper had published Logik der Forschung in late 1934 (with the impressum of the following year) 
(Popper 1935). The physics journal Physikalische Zeitschrift had originally commissioned a review from 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who had however declined and recommended Hermann instead, because 
he had just been involved in a controversy with Popper in the pages of Die Naturwissenschaften (Popper 
and Weizsäcker 1934). Weizsäcker had pointed out a technical error in an ill-fated attempt by Popper to 
show the incompleteness of quantum mechanics. A thought experiment was supposed to allow one to 
reconstruct both the position and the momentum of one particle by appropriate measurements on 
another particle that had collided with it (but without being able to select which particle of an ensemble 
had these precise values). Thus – much like EPR the following year (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935) – 
Popper wanted to show that quantum mechanics was correct (because ensembles violating the 
uncertainty relations could not be prepared) but incomplete (because individual particles within these 
ensembles had precise values of position and momentum).2  
Hermann singles out two elements that play a crucial role in Popper’s philosophy of science: Popper’s 
falsificationism (which she summarises with some sensitivity) and his notion of the theory-ladenness of 
observation – both approvingly. Indeed, Hermann is firmly committed to the idea that there are no pure 
observations. But, as a Kantian, she believes inherent theoretical elements to be a priori, and rejects 
Popper’s idea that basic statements are stipulations, which for her debases science ‘to a blind play of 
dogmatic whimsy’. 
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Hermann then goes on to criticise what she describes as Popper’s ‘only example treated in detail – the 
interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations’. She does not summarise the controversy between 
Popper and Weizsäcker, but identifies the reason for Popper’s mistake as being his reliance on the 
probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanical wave functions as relating to ensembles of systems. 
(Indeed, the ensemble interpretation of probability pervades the entire Logik der Forschung.3)  
What Popper neglects, according to Hermann, is that this interpretation of wave functions as providing 
statistical descriptions of ensembles stands in a complementary relationship to their use as providing 
state descriptions of individual systems, which are thereby also subject to the uncertainty relations. 
These comments shed light also on her own views on quantum mechanics, because this is the first place 
where she explicitly talks of the complementarity between these two aspects of the quantum mechanical 
description. 
 
2 Comment on Schlick 
Schlick’s talk on ‘Quantentheorie and Erkennbarkeit der Natur’ (Schlick 1936) was his contribution to the 
Second International Congress on the Unity of Science, devoted to ‘The Problem of Causality’. It was held 
in Copenhagen 21–26 June 1936, under the presiding genius of Niels Bohr among others. Schlick, 
however, was not present when his talk was read to the congress – in fact he had been murdered in 
Vienna on 22 June. 
The talk itself argues very lucidly that the limitations on the possibility of knowledge that are imposed by 
quantum mechanics are not subjective limitations in the sense that there should remain something 
unknown but unknowable – as arguably for Kant the knowledge of things in themselves. ‘The limit of 
knowability is at the same time the limit of law-likeness in nature’ (Schlick 1936, p. 319). Measurement 
does not disturb already existing features of physical systems, nor does it force these to acquire such 
features. We observe only measurement results, and claims that a system has some position or 
momentum when these quantities are ‘indeterminate’ are strictly meaningless (ibid., pp. 321–322).  
Similarly, Schlick wishes to establish that, insofar as the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics 
suggest also limitations for knowability in other parts of nature, e.g. the life sciences, these are again 
limitations on what there is to be known. They do not leave room for, say, ‘the so-called freedom of the 
will or the assumption of spiritual substances’ (p. 317), or the idea that ‘a full knowledge of life processes 
might perhaps remain precluded to us because the precise observations required for such knowledge 
would disturb the life processes themselves’ (p. 323).  
Schlick is keen to establish in particular that the latter is not what Niels Bohr is suggesting with his (‘truly 
deep’) remarks about life (p. 318). Rather, so Schlick, Bohr’s remarks should be interpreted in the 
following sense. Even though physical (indeed classical) concepts are indispensable in describing results 
of observations, we may expect any physical concepts to prove inadequate in the description of life 
processes, just as classical concepts have proved inadequate in the description of physical processes (p. 
326). 
Hermann appreciated Schlick’s paper, which according to her ‘was the best that was presented at this 
congress from the positivist side’,4 but not its criticism of Kant – including the implicit criticism of 
 
3 It was only in the 1950s that Popper was to propose his interpretation of singular probabilities as 
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causality. She took her comment as the opportunity to clarify these issues based on her own work on 
quantum mechanics and on transcendental idealism. 
Hermann points out the apparent tensions among some of the features of quantum mechanics discussed 
by Schlick, and claims that these get resolved if one understands quantum mechanical descriptions as 
relative to a context of observation. This is Hermann’s central interpretational move, and the one that 
reconciles Kant and quantum mechanics.  
Indeed, for Hermann, Bohr’s indispensability of classical concepts is the same as the necessity of Kant’s a 
priori notions. But – in what is in fact a Friesian element – she understands the criteria of application of 
Kant’s notions to be a matter open to empirical investigation. The lesson of quantum mechanics is that 
classical notions can be applied (within the limits of the uncertainty relations) only relative to 
observational contexts, and not in the passage between one context and the next. In this sense, the limits 
of knowledge discussed by Kant turn out to agree with those imposed by quantum mechanics. In 
particular, the principle of causality is vindicated, because it finds strict application within each 
observational context.5    
Hermann does not give the details of her arguments here –  referring instead to her main essay on 
quantum mechanics, ‘Die naturphilosophischen Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik’ (Herrmann 2019, pp. 
205–258) [‘Natural-philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics’ (Crull and Bacciagaluppi 2017, pp. 
239–278)]. But she makes a noteworthy if passing remark about the apparent ‘collapse’ of the wave 
function: it is not a real physical process, because among other things it would have to propagate faster 
than light. This is a criticism of collapse that tends to be missing from the writings of other proponents of 
‘Copenhagen’ views like Bohr or Heisenberg.6  
 
3 Congrès Descartes 
Hermann was clearly interested in the dialogue with the logical positivists. In particular, besides her 
participation in the Unity of Science congress and active contacts with the Berlin Circle,7 Hermann was 
busy organising a meeting in Heidelberg for September 1936, where major approaches to the theory of 
knowledge were to have been presented by herself, by Schlick and by the prominent logicist Heinrich 
Scholz. While the meeting took place on a smaller scale (in particular without Schlick), Hermann 
presented her results there, and published them in 1937 as ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer 
Aussagen in den älteren und den modernen Theorien’ [‘On the Foundations of Physical Statements in the 
Older and the Modern Theories’] (Herrmann 2019, pp. 275–334), which is the most detailed statement of 
her position in natural philosophy. It is unclear whether Hermann attended the Third Congress in Paris at 
the end of July 1937 (Otto Neurath had invited her on 10 June, see again the catalogue of Hermann’s 
Nachlass), but she appears to have organised a small private philosophy meeting there a few days later, 
as a follow-up to the Heidelberg meeting.8 Between the Third Congress and that meeting (if it took place), 
 
5 For more on Hermann’s neo-Kantianism, see Paparo (2017), Crull (2017) and Cuffaro (2020), as well as 
Bacciagaluppi (in preparation a).  
6 This criticism is spelled out in more detail in Hermann’s own discussion of the EPR paper (and was perhaps 
prompted by it). See again her letter to Scholtz and Kratzer of two weeks later (Herrmann 2019, Letter 28), as 
well as Bacciagaluppi (in preparation b). 
7 Cf. Milkov (2008, p. 57), who cites Danneberg and Schernus (1994, pp. 396–397, fn 26). There is further a 
report in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 1 February 1935 of a talk by Hermann for the Berlin Circle on 
‘Korrektur des Kausalprinzips’ [‘Correction to the Causality Principle’] (see the catalogue of Hermann’s 
Nachlass in the Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bad Godesberg). 
8 Cf. Letters 33 and 38 in Herrmann (2019). 
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Hermann also presented her position at the Ninth International Congress of Philosophy (Congrès 
Descartes). The brief published contribution to the proceedings is the third paper translated here.  
The position Hermann summarises is an extension of her work on quantum mechanics. She had first 
provided an analysis of special and general relativity in another essay, ‘Die Bedeutung der modernen 
Physik für die Theorie der Erkenntnis’ [‘The Significance of Modern Physics for the Theory of Knowledge’] 
(Herrmann 2019, pp. 325–377), which was awarded a prize from the Saxon Academy of Sciences on the 
same fateful 22 June 1936. There she argued that while formally special and general relativity could 
provide an absolute description in terms of Minkowskian manifolds, the bridge between the formalism 
and the data of perception was provided by the intuitions of space and time applied in each (global or 
local) inertial system. In ‘Über die Grundlagen physikalischer Aussagen...’ she then extended the analysis 
further, starting from a (Friesian) analysis of the theoretical elements with which we organise our 
everyday experience – and noting that they closely match the mechanical world picture of classical 
physics – then examining where electrodynamics, relativity and quantum mechanics appear to depart 
from them, and arguing that in fact they do not.9  
Hermann’s conclusion is that, where modern physics departs from classical physics, it is always and only 
by relinquishing the assumption that in the attempt to connect the data of perception into a body of 
physical knowledge, the Kantian notions can be applied uniformly across all contexts of observation. She 
presents this as fitting into a reading of transcendental idealism along the lines of the neo-Kantianism of 
Fries and her own teacher Nelson: the a priori principles apply only to the objects of our finite 
observations, which ‘cut’ through the fundamentally unintuitive structure of relations described by 
physics. This, however, glosses over the novelty of Hermann’s approach in which the criteria of 
application of the principles may depend crucially on the different contexts –  ensuring objectivity but not 
at the price of absolutism.   
After the war, Hermann was to direct her main efforts towards the reconstruction of Germany’s 
education system, but she continued to work on her revised understanding of transcendental idealism 
and its repercussions not only for natural philosophy but also for the debates on life, free will, and ethical 
and political responsibility.  
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Review of: K. Popper, Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft. 
Octavo. vi+248 pp. Berlin 1935. Julius Springer. Sewn. Reichsmark 13.5010 
Grete Hermann 
 
Popper wishes to set up the ‘rules of the game “empirical science”’ (p. 22) [‘rules of the game of empirical 
science’, p. 32].11 In fact, what he offers as the pattern of scientific research is nothing but a game with 
statements that, if anything, express only prejudices. The interest lies not in this outcome, but in the path 
that leads to it. 
Indeed, Popper’s constructions are based on two thoughts that are undoubtedly correct and significant 
for natural philosophy – largely leaning on positivist lines of reasoning, but in some places pursuing these 
uncommonly far to their extreme consequences. The first one: testing and justification of physical 
hypotheses never aims for an absolute and definitive foundation (verification); it rather exposes the 
stated claims to the possibility of being refuted (falsified) by contrary facts, abandons them in the case of 
such refutation, and otherwise retains them as corroborated, but always with the right to retract them or 
to make refining corrections (p. 6f) [p. 10]. 
This is combined with the second observation: there is no statement of experience, as simple and 
primitive a claim as it may be, that in this sense is not already application of a theory and thereby shares 
its character of being at most a well corroborated hypothesis. For even the simplest general concepts 
under which we subsume the objects around us include aspects of law-like behaviour (p. 52f) [p. 76]; 
therefore their application goes already beyond the mere findings of perception. 
On the basis of these considerations Popper builds his edifice of definitions and methodological 
prescriptions: empirical science is defined as a system of statements to which only the requirement of 
testability through experience applies (falsifiability), not that of rigorous foundation (p. 12f) [p. 18]. The 
question of a criterion for the degree of this testability is discussed in detail. 
Already this definition bears rich fruit for natural philosophy. Since the testing of general physical 
statements consists only in checking the occurrence of particular statements – predictions – drawn from 
them, for Popper all the difficulties disappear that are connected with the attempt to found general 
statements of experience: the problems of induction and of causality are eliminated.   
But further: since also the singular statements of experience – the basic statements that bring about 
failure or corroboration of theories – enter the investigations only as applications of theoretical posits, in 
the end failure or corroboration of theories is brought about by other theories that already count as 
corroborated. (In particular, a theory can be refuted by a singular statement only when this refutation 
takes place in the framework of a refuting theory that is itself corroborated by the singular statement, p. 
47 [p. 66].) But now, where should the chain of theories end that corroborate or refute one another? 
Popper prescribes: there may be no limits to testability; but since testing must stop somewhere, and 
since the basic statements to which it stretches are as little capable of rigorous foundation as other 
statements of experience, it shall be left to the researcher to decide on their acceptance, in a way that 
can be explained by the experiences that have convinced them, but is unjustified and unjustifiable. These 
 
10 Translated by Guido Bacciagaluppi (g.bacciagaluppi@uu.nl), from the reprint in Kay Herrmann (ed.), Grete 
Henry-Hermann: Philosophie – Mathematik – Quantenmechanik (Springer, 2019), pp. 269–271. Originally 
published in German in Physikalische Zeitschrift 36(13), 481–481 (1935). Thanks to the editors for a careful 
reading of the translation. 
11 Translator’s note: Where Hermann gives page references or quotations from Logik der Forschung, I add in 
square brackets the corresponding page references or quotations from The logic of scientific discovery (in the 
2002 Routledge Classics edition). 
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basic statements, which decide on the corroboration or failure of physical theories, are ‘from a logical 
point of view arbitrary stipulations’ (p. 65) [‘from the logical point of view, accepted by an act, by a free 
decision’, p. 92].12 
Popper has again freed himself in one stroke from a whole knot of problems in natural philosophy – from 
all those that concern the cognitive character of perception and the possibility of founding empirical 
judgements in perception. At the same time it becomes clear what price he pays for this release from 
natural-philosophical difficulties: through definitions he has first curtailed the claim to truth of the 
empirical sciences, then completely thrown it out of the study of nature. The pains of justifying it are 
clearly gone, but only because science is debased to a blind play of dogmatic whimsy. The comfort 
offered by Popper, that ‘this kind of dogmatism’ is ‘harmless’, because the basic statements accepted 
through arbitrary stipulation may indeed ‘be tested further if the need to do so should arise’ (p. 61) [‘this 
kind of dogmatism is innocuous since, should the need arise, these statements can easily be tested 
further’, p. 87] is unable to cast a more favourable light on this outcome. Arbitrariness is not reduced by 
removing it step by step to ever different places. 
The two crucial thoughts mentioned at the beginning, which are the starting point for Popper’s 
considerations, hold true. They have always presented difficulties and problems for the interpretation of 
physical research in terms of natural philosophy. They must be confronted by those who ask of scientific 
claims the Kantian question ‘Quid juris?’. Popper asks this question (p. 4) [p. 7]; but he forgets to account 
to himself or the reader what the claim to knowledge is in fact directed towards. Thus for him the 
question: Quid juris? shifts furtively to the other question: How should this claim to knowledge be 
constituted in order to blend as smoothly as possibly with the two mentioned characteristics of science? 
Understandedly, the easiest solution is to eliminate such a claim to knowledge completely. But this 
observation has nothing to do with justifying physics’ claim to knowledge. 
Quite as to illustrate how Popper’s considerations fall beside the point of the problems raised by physics, 
the only example treated in detail – the interpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations – is based on 
a misunderstanding of quantum mechanics. The physical mistake in the crucial thought experiment – 
which is supposed to show the possibility of predicting under appropriate conditions the position and 
momentum of an electron with a precision exceeding the uncertainty relations – has already been 
clarified in Popper’s controversy with Weizsäcker (Naturwissenschaften 22, issue 48 of 30 November 
1934). The more detailed treatment of quantum mechanics that Popper gives in his book reveals the 
reason for this mistake. Popper lets himself be misled by the probabilistic interpretation of the wave 
functions into applying these quantum mechanical state descriptions (and the uncertainty relations they 
lead to) only to ensembles of physical systems – according to the procedure in probability theory of 
translating statements about probabilities into statements about relative frequencies. He thus does not 
presuppose that an appropriately selected individual system  must respect the uncertainty relations. In 
this he neglects that the duality experiments force one to apply features of the particle picture as well as 
of the wave picture already to individual systems, but thereby also to limit the applicability of the two 
pictures in accordance with the uncertainty relations. How these two sides of the quantum mechanical 
formalism – on the one hand the probabilistic interpretation of the wave function, on the other its 
utilisability as a state description of an individual physical system – are to be reconciled is a physical 
problem that is solved by Bohr’s doctrine of complementarity, but cannot be eliminated through a one-








Comment on Schlick13 
Grete Hermann 
 
The problem of natural philosophy raised by quantum mechanics can be characterised with two pairs of 
statements that have featured in Schlick’s discussion but without Schlick having highlighted, let alone 
resolved, the contradiction that seems present between the propositions of each pair: 
(1a) The uncertainty relations do not represent merely subjective limits to possible observations, in the 
sense that there should be real features of a physical system that are unobservable. Rather, an atomic 
system has no simultaneously sharp position and momentum. 
(1b) Nevertheless, the replacement of a state description of a system, which is to be performed based on 
a measurement – say of a wave function that is ‘spread out’ over the whole of space – through another 
one – say a wave function with exact specification of position –, cannot be understood as specifying a real 
physical process in space in which a wave extended over the whole of space ‘shrinks’ to a wave packet 
concentrated within a small range of positions. (A notion which, apart from other physical absurdities, 
would include the assumption of processes propagating superluminally.) 
Similarly the contrast in the other pair of claims: 
(2a) The intuitive conceptions of classical physics prove inadequate to the task of a fully quantum 
mechanical description of a physical system. 
(2b) Nevertheless, according to Bohr’s correspondence principle, also in quantum mechanics every single 
step from an observation to how it is put to use in the physical formalism, and vice versa from a formula 
derived in the formalism to the corresponding prediction of an observation, can and must be interpreted 
entirely using the classical-intuitive conceptions. 
The seamless reconciliation of the respective (a) and (b) is possible only by supposing that the quantum 
mechanical state description of a physical system – as opposed to the state description in classical physics 
– does not pretend to characterise the physical system uniquely and adequately, but only relative to the 
context of observation then present, and that it changes with the latter. 
Thereby however, as shown by more detailed considerations, the opposition disappears that Schlick 
claims between the limitations of knowledge demonstrated by Kant in his doctrine of transcendental 
idealism and the limits of natural description that quantum mechanics forces us to recognise – at least 
insofar as one takes into account the corrections brought by Fries and Nelson to the formulation and 
justification of this doctrine. It becomes equally manifest that quantum mechanics has in truth not 
brought about the alleged refutation of the a priori principles of natural philosophy postulated by Kant, in 
particular of the law of causality. Rather, quantum mechanics revises the usual version of the principle of 
causality only insofar as it separates it from the assumption often conjoined with it that physics must lead 
to a unique adequate description of nature. It otherwise upholds the presupposition of seamless causal 
connections. (To justify these claims, I can here merely refer to my essay ‘Die naturphilosophischen 
Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik’ [‘The natural-philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics’], 
Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, vol. VI, issue 2, Sections 9, 12, 16–18.)    
 
 
13 Translated by Guido Bacciagaluppi (g.bacciagaluppi@uu.nl), from the reprint in Kay Herrmann (ed.), Grete 
Henry-Hermann: Philosophie – Mathematik – Quantenmechanik (Springer, 2019), pp. 273–274. Originally 
published in German as ‘Zum Vortrag Schlicks’ [‘On Schlick’s Talk’], Erkenntnis 6(5/6), 342–343 (1936). Thanks 
to the editors for a careful reading of the translation. 
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The significance for natural philosophy of the move from classical to modern physics14 
Grete Hermann 
 
SUMMARY – This study shows how, despite the changes it has introduced, modern physics preserves 
certain fundamental ideas of classical physics (Bohr’s correspondence principle). While it gives up 
much of the ideal of a mechanistic physics, it still remains tied to Kant’s thesis that the forms of 
intuition and the categories are the necessary presuppositions for the knowledge of nature. 
 
1. The development of modern physics has two distinctive aspects: on the one hand the demand for a 
revision of almost all fundamental assumptions on which the knowledge of nature has been based until 
now, and indeed for a revision based on experience; on the other hand the upholding of certain 
fundamental conceptions of classical physics, which finds its strongest expression in Bohr’s 
correspondence principle. Modern physics presents us with the problem within natural philosophy of 
reconciling these two aspects. 
2. The dualism between the wave and particle picture in quantum mechanics, with its consequences for 
[our] causal command of natural phenomena represents the strongest departure from the classical 
picture of nature. But this departure is closely connected to a series of earlier transformations in the 
picture of nature. The first step in this direction is taken in Maxwell’s theory, which detaches the wave 
picture from the presupposition of a material support until then taken for granted. A further stage is the 
theory of relativity, with the demonstration that one cannot ascribe to matter a definite state of motion 
with respect to the ‘ether’. Finally, while the steps up to now have brought the wave and particle picture 
more and more into opposition, quantum mechanics leads one to applying them again to one and the 
same atomic process.   
3. The starting point of this development is characterised by the abandonment of an old expectation, 
which in the Enlightenment dominated research in both physics and natural philosophy, namely the 
expectation that in the end physics would reduce completely to classical mechanics. What distinguishes 
this discipline is in fact its intuitive spatiotemporal modelling of natural phenomena. The construction of 
such a model proceeds by finding substances that fill space, determining the interactions obtaining 
between them, and the causal modifications of their state of motion thereby brought about. The 
fundamental concepts in the picture of nature of classical mechanics thus correspond so precisely to the 
Kantian forms of intuition and categories, that on the one hand Kant’s philosophy has been seen as a 
justification for privileging classical mechanics, and on the other hand the discovery of the limits of 
classical mechanics has been taken as a refutation of Kant’s insights. 
4. If one analyses more closely the physical arguments that have led to this discovery, however, it turns 
out that Kant’s fundamental concepts nowhere fail to apply. The experiments that ground the derivation 
of Maxwell’s equations examine the interaction between material bodies; measurements of spatial and 
temporal relations in the theory of relativity presuppose the classical intuitions of Euclidean space and of 
an objective determination of simultaneity; quantum mechanics presupposes causal explanations in its 
 
14 Translated by Guido Bacciagaluppi (g.bacciagaluppi@uu.nl), from the reprint in Kay Herrmann (ed.), Grete 
Henry-Hermann: Philosophie – Mathematik – Quantenmechanik (Springer, 2019), pp. 379–381. Originally 
published in German (with French summary) as ‘Die naturphilosophische Bedeutung des Übergangs von der 
klassischen zur modernen Physik’, Chapter XVII in Raymond Bayer (ed.), Travaux du IXe Congrès International 
de Philosophie – Congrès Descartes. Vol. VII, Causalité et Déterminisme. Actualités Scientifiques et 




theory of measurement, also for unpredictable events – indeed it is only by displaying these already 
known causes that it can establish the futility of a further search for causes, and thus the fundamental 
significance of the limits set to prediction.  
5. In each of these disciplines however – in each case at a different place in the physical picture of nature 
– one relinquishes an assumption that is straightforwardly satisfied in classical mechanics and was tacitly 
the basis for the programme of reducing the whole of physics to classical mechanics. It is the assumption 
that every application of the classical connecting principles can be held on to unambiguously throughout 
the whole physical interpretation of natural phenomena. According to this assumption, what can be 
interpreted in some context as a substance, as simultaneous, as equally long, as matter in motion, must 
be interpreted in the same way in each observational context. It is in truth this assumption that has been 
abandoned beginning with Maxwell’s theory and in ever more radical ways in modern physics. This is the 
explanation for the many natural-philosophical paradoxes that prevent the intuitive interpretation of the 
results of modern physics. 
6. Modern physics thus indeed accords with Kant’s thesis that the above-mentioned forms of intuition 
and categories are necessary preconditions for the knowledge of nature. Instead, the distinctive step that 
sets physics apart from the picture of nature of classical mechanics rules out any realist interpretation of 
physics that sees in the picture of nature provided by physics an adequate description of the phenomena. 
In this sense – when one examines its modes of argumentation closely – modern physics serves the 
purpose of extending and endorsing another Kantian idea: that of transcendental idealism – in the form 
given to it by the works of the Friesian school whereby knowledge of nature does not adequately capture 
reality, but in an imperfect way only extracts relational structures from it, the grounds of which remain 
undetermined within the framework of this knowledge. 
    
 
